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Abstract
By examining US Airways Flight 1549’s glider-like landing on New York
City’s Hudson River on 15 January 2009, this article contributes to a deeper
understanding of the psycho- and socio-analytic aspects of American cul-
ture. Using system psychodynamics as a conceptual framework, the essay
uses this case study to demonstrate how individual psychology, group
dynamics, and systemic influences intertwined to tap a collective societal
need for a traditional male hero to salve the cultural disillusionment created
by corporate scandals, executive greed, job loss, and terrorist attacks in post-
9/11 America. Understanding how this phenomenon occurred helps us grap-
ple with psycho-cultural factors that favour searching for a saviour over
recognising collective responsibilities that encourage more collaborative
approaches to crisis decision making.
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‘Everything I had done in my career had in some way been a preparation
for that moment’.
Captain Chesley B. Sullenberger III, US Airways Captain, Flight 1549, 
after landing his airliner on the Hudson River (Sullenberger, 2009a)
THE INCIDENT
On 15 January 2009, US Airways Flight 1549 departed New York City’s
LaGuardia Airport at 3.25 pm en route to Charlotte, North Carolina.
The co-pilot, First Officer Jeffrey Skiles, was flying the aircraft when,
about ninety seconds after take-off, the Airbus A320 struck a large
flock of Canada Geese, ingesting birds into both engines.
‘It sounded like it was “raining birds” ‘ the captain, Chesley
‘Sully’ Sullenberger III, recalled. They filled the windscreen, ‘large
dark birds’ like a ‘black and white photograph’. He felt vibrations,
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could smell ‘cooked bird’ and felt ‘a dramatic loss of thrust’. ‘He was
surprised at how symmetrical the loss of thrust was’; there was no
yaw or sideward motion (NTSB, 2009a). It had to be a complete loss
of both engines. ‘It was the worst sickening pit of your stomach,
falling through the floor feeling I’ve ever felt in my life,’ the captain
recalled. ‘I knew immediately it was very bad’ (Couric, 2009a).
Radioing for assistance, Captain Sullenberger reported, ‘Cactus
1539 [sic] hit birds. We lost thrust in both engines. We’re turning
back towards LaGuardia’ (FAA, 2009).
Air Traffic Controller Patrick Harten immediately stopped all
departures and responded, ‘Do you want to try to land runway one
three?’, which was the shortest turn for the Airbus-turned-glider.
‘We’re unable. We may end up in the Hudson.’
‘Okay, what do you need to land?’
‘I’m not sure we can make any runway. What’s over to our right,
anything in New Jersey? Maybe Teterboro.’
‘Off to your right is Teterboro Airport. Do you want to try and go
to Teterboro?’
‘Yes.’
‘Cactus 1529 [sic] turn right two-eight-zero. You can land runway
one at Teterboro.’
Passing through 2,000 feet and descending fast over New York
City, the captain made his decision.
‘We can’t do it. We’re gonna be in the Hudson’.
That was the last radio transmission from Cactus 1549.
With both engines dead, attempts to restart futile, and the water
approaching swiftly, Captain Sullenberger asked his co-pilot ‘Got
any ideas?’
‘Actually not’, he replied.
Moments later the Airbus skidded across the surface of the Hudson
River, sending up huge plumes of water until it came to rest just north
of New York City’s 39th Street ferry dock. Less than six minutes had
elapsed since take-off. Within moments, an ad hoc flotilla of water-
way ferries, Coast Guard vessels, and police-, fire- and tug-boats con-
verged on the scene, expeditiously evacuating all passengers and
crew safely. Only five people were seriously injured with broken
bones, twenty-six were transported to local hospitals and the rest
were treated for hypothermia and sent home (NTSB, 2009b).
To many, it seemed as if a miracle had occurred. It was an un-
precedented failure in an unforgiving environment with little time
to prepare or react. Later, Captain Sullenberger even doubted that
the emergency could be effectively mimicked in the flight simulator.
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None the less, there is more to learn from this scenario about cultural
understanding of response to crisis and risk.
METHODOLOGY
The analysis offered in this article is inspired by two popular research
methods used in leadership, organisation, and management studies
of disaster: text-based research (Snook, 2000; Feldman, 2004; Brown,
2005; Stein, 2007; Long, 2008; Tempest, Starkey, and Ennew, 2007) and
psychoanalytic study (Schwartz, 1987, 1989; Hirschhorn, 1997; Elmes
and Barry, 1999; Kayes, 2002, 2004, 2006; Stein, 2004; Fraher, 2004, 2005,
2011; Weick, 1993, 1995) with a specific focus on examining factors
that contribute to performance breakdown. Drawing on a wide range
of disciplines including psychology, sociology, human factors,
ergonomics, and engineering, crisis decision-making studies analyse
what went wrong in infamous examples of organisational disasters
such as the NASA Columbia and Challenger crash, the 1996 Mount
Everest climbing catastrophe, and the Enron scandal, to name a few.
In such studies, researchers use text-based research and psychoana-
lytic study to tease out performance breakdown so that others can
learn from previous organisational mistakes.
For example, Feldman (2004) found that time pressure and a priv-
ileging of quantitative data over other information sources at NASA
created an organisational dynamic predisposed to launch, daring
engineers to prove it was unsafe to fly rather than the reverse. This
distorted safety culture directly contributed to both the Challenger
and Columbia space shuttle disasters.
Elmes and Barry (1999) analysed the 1996 Mount Everest climbing
disaster that killed five people, deducing that commercial develop-
ments in the high-altitude climbing field fostered the emergence of
competitive and regressive dynamics and narcissism in a way that
undermined teamwork. Through this lens, disasters are seen to
result from the complex ‘interaction of particular psychological and
sociostructural dynamics’ (p. 164), not just individual error.
Stein (2007) examined the 2001 collapse of Enron, identifying
micro and macro factors which helped generate an Oedipal mindset
in company leaders resulting in arrogance, insularity, and ultimately
the company’s demise.
And Fraher (2011) analysed several fatal organisation failures such
as the USS Greeneville collision, the Hillsborough football crush,
American Airline in-flight breakup, and the Bristol Royal Infirmary
paediatric fatalities, to demonstrate how teamwork is often more
important than technical prowess in averting disasters.
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Using similar methods – text-based research and psychoanalytic
study – to a different end, this essay explores the successful avoid-
ance of disaster through the case study of Flight 1549. Analysing
data from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reports, National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) documents, crew and survivor
interviews, books, television newscasts, newspaper and magazine
articles, it provides a way to understand how what ‘went right’ on
the Hudson River that day combined with other cultural influences
to provoke a unique collective reading of this accident in America.
In particular, the article explores the tendency among US media,
politicians, and society at large to avoid noticing the extraordinary
teamwork in favour of celebrating the actions of one hero-individ-
ual that fateful day. Examining micro and macro elements as well as
the interaction of psychological and socio-structural dynamics
through individual, group, and systemic factors, this methodology
enables us to comprehend the deep cultural strands framing
America’s enthralment with individual heroes. Through this sys-
tems psychodynamics approach it becomes clear that hero-making
can be a collective defence against the anxiety of accepting respon-
sibility and risk. The ideas developed in this article have application
as an indicator of broad themes in contemporary culture regarding
the use of heroes as a defence, particularly in post-9/11 America.
THE MEDIA RESPONSE
Almost immediately after Cactus 1549 touched down, the news media
began referring to Captain Sullenberger as ‘the hero-pilot’ (Wilson
and Buettner, 2009: A1). Within hours, New York’s Governor, David
A. Paterson, proclaimed the landing ‘a miracle on the Hudson’ and
New York City’s Mayor, Michael R. Bloomberg, himself a pilot, called
it a ‘masterful job’. The entire nation became riveted by the ‘hero-
pilot’, whose uniform had ‘barely a wrinkle’, tie was hardly loosened
and ‘wispy grey hair and David Niven mustache were unruffled’
(Rivera, 2009). Mayor Bloomberg thanked the captain ‘for renewing
our faith in the strength of human spirit’, emphasizing how ‘Captain
Cool’ (Goldenberg, 2009) walked the cabin aisles twice to ensure no
one was left behind before he exited (McFadden, 2009).
In the days following the accident, both President Bush and
President-Elect Obama telephoned the captain offering thanks and
congratulations. Captain Sullenberger attended President Obama’s
inauguration in Washington DC, the National Football League’s
Superbowl XLIII in Tampa, the Oscar Awards in Los Angeles, and
appeared on several television shows in New York City. Wearing a
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Giants jersey inscribed with ‘Sully’ and ‘155’, the number of sur-
vivors, captain threw out the first pitch of the Giants season opener
in San Francisco. And even the twice bankrupt US Airway’s stock
price soared in celebration, up 13% the day after the accident.
With the story headlined everywhere, America was captivated.
Yet, while the general public learned about Captain Sully within
hours, The New York Times did not report the names or describe the
brave actions of the other crew members – First Officer Jeff Skiles
and Flight Attendants Doreen Walsh, Sheila Dail, and Donna Dent
– until three days after the accident. The technical prowess of
Captain Sullenberger – an Air Force Academy graduate, military jet
pilot and thirty-year airline veteran – dead-sticking his airliner to a
perfect seaplane-like landing on the Hudson River seemed so com-
pellingly romantic it was difficult not to be seduced.
Yet, although Captain Sullenberger did make an extraordinary
landing, the reality was that the successful rescue of all people
aboard the jet was the result of excellent teamwork and not only the
work of a single hero-pilot. Understanding why teamwork was less
well known or emphasised might help us grapple with psycho-cul-
tural factors that favour searching for a saviour to lead us out of cri-
sis over fostering more collaborative decision-making approaches to
crisis management.
THE ‘HERO’ AS A CONSTRUCT
As a construct, the ‘hero’ serves many social functions. Historically,
the hero was a mythological god like Hercules, religious prophet
like Mahomet, or king like Napoleon (Carlyle, 1942). In these roles
the hero, part-god, part-human and nearly always male, provided an
appealing internal symbol – whether it be of strength, virility,
courage, nationalism, cunning, or goodness – which other men could
aspire to and pass along in stories to future generations.
One of the major epic examples is Homer’s Odysseus, a poem
about a warrior-turned-adventurer who journeys for ten years after
the Trojan War before finally returning home. This story remains
popular because of its intriguing allusion to life as an odyssey, a
long wandering travail with frequent changes of fortune. Many con-
temporary heroic sagas display similar patterns, rooted more in
myth than historical fact. Like Sullenberger’s storybook tale from
small town boy to Air Force jet pilot and exemplary airline captain,
typically the hero’s journey begins with a departure from the com-
forts of home, a call to adventure, followed by a trial of the hero’s
skills and commitment. Finally, he returns home and struggles to
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reconcile his new hero status and two worlds of life experiences
(Campbell, 1949).
As society evolved from an oral tradition of heroic storytelling to
the techno-savvy media of today, the notion of the hero archetype
changed as well. Helped along by the atrocities committed by self-
proclaimed heroes such as Hitler, Mao, Mussolini, and Stalin, inter-
est in hero-worship and the stories of ‘Great Men’ gave way to
different images of greatness (Dubner, 2001). In post-Second World
War America, for instance, a backlash against the Vietnam War, cor-
rupt politicians, and middle-class organisational life combined with
the increasing influence of social movements and the entertainment
industry to generate a new type of American hero. As trust in estab-
lishment figures waned, this new archetype ‘turned on, tuned in,
and dropped out’ by ‘questioning authority’ and ‘doing his own
thing’. Musicians like Bob Dylan, artists like Andy Warhol, counter-
culture leaders like Timothy Leary, and poets like Jack Kerouac
gained American favour, while soldiers returning from Vietnam
were spat upon. Emerging at just the right emotional moment in his-
tory, these iconoclastic heroes became an enduring internalised
image, appealing to followers’ imagination while satiating their
desire to connect to something larger than themselves.
The American hero is a reflection of our fantasised selves – what
we wanted the characteristics of ‘an American’ to be – reflecting
society’s innermost hopes and beliefs in a public way, a barometer
of public opinion (Fishwick, 1969). America has always loved the
mythic rugged individual, the phallic hero. No longer interested in
the heroes’ odyssey, the nation that developed Hollywood and mass
media wanted sound-bites about the latest rags-to-riches athlete,
movie star, or billionaire, not the whole epic saga.
New American archetypes emerged whose achievements were
often based on materialistic success. A gradual yet continuous move-
ment away from the idea of heroism as a journey of public service,
character development and commitment to others, towards singu-
larly unique talents often based on good luck and individualism
took place. Investors like Warren Buffett, software entrepreneurs
like Bill Gates, economists like Alan Greenspan, hedge fund man-
agers like George Soros, and real estate developers like Donald
Trump captivated America’s attention, often simply because of their
astounding wealth and power and the lifestyle it afforded them. A
Google search of any one of the individuals mentioned generates
millions of world wide web hits – Warren Buffet tops the list at 5.7
million – evidencing this fascination.
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After 9/11, America’s definition of heroism continued to evolve. No
doubt influenced by terrorist attacks, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and
the contentious politics of the time, Americans now reportedly define
heroism as ‘risking oneself to benefit others’, ‘acting selflessly’, and
‘confronting risk’ (Rankin and Eagly, 2008, p. 414). This represents 
a huge shift from previous decades’ studies, which often found 
fictional characters like Superman or actors like Tom Cruise named
in polls of the most admired (Jolley, 2007, p. 24). Today, Americans
are more likely to identify activists like Martin Luther King Jr, politi-
cians like Abraham Lincoln, rescuers like fire-fighters, and defend-
ers like soldiers as American heroes (Rankin and Eagly, 2008).
America has had a long fascination with heroes and, perhaps more
than any other nation, has perfected the ‘art of hero-making’. Who
can forget the image of Charles Lindbergh landing in Paris, Martin
Luther King Jr marching on Washington DC, or John F. Kennedy
asking us to ‘ask not’? Just as enduring are the images of US marines
raising the American flag atop Mount Sarabachi during the Second
World War, or New York City firemen charging up the stairs to res-
cue people from the World Trade Centre Towers in 2001. Although
these individuals and teams were obviously real, their heroism also
reflected a social construction that reflected the motives, ideologies,
and needs of observers at the time (Boorstein, 1987).
For instance, after initially suffering large numbers of casualties in
Asia during the Second World War, the Mount Sarabachi photograph
was used to symbolise a turning point in the war, bolstering public
support. Upon seeing the image, President Franklin Roosevelt
ordered the photographed marines stateside for a savings bond tour
which generated over $26 billion, twice the initial goal. Similarly, 9/11
images of dedicated fire-fighters, police, and other rescue workers
selflessly charging into the collapsing twin towers and searching the
rubble for survivors were used to enflame already raw public emo-
tions, building support for President Bush’s ‘war on terror’ and the
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
What does the social construction of Captain Sullenberger as the
pilot-hero tell us about the needs of Americans in January 2009? In
other words, let’s explore some of the possible purposes it served for
America to make Captain Sullenberger the hero-pilot at this point in
time.
A DECADE OF ESCALATING FRUSTRATIONS
In the opening years of the twenty-first century, Americans endur-
ed shocking examples of corporate scandal and flawed regulatory
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oversight such as Enron and Arthur Andersen in 2001, WorldCom,
Halliburton, and Global Crossing in 2002, Peregrine in 2003, and
Tyco in 2004, among many others. Frustrated by greedy executives
who lacked any semblance of personal ethics or commitment to the
greater good, along with the bursting of the dot.com bubble, many
Americans moved their money out of the stock market and into real
estate, pursuing the ‘American Dream’ of home ownership (Patsuris,
2002).
Capitalising on low interest rates and easy credit, these home pur-
chases drove real estate values to record highs and the quality of
mortgages to all-time lows. Bank executives devised new ways to let
home buyers leverage themselves to the hilt through sub-prime
mortgages, while protecting themselves against risk through suspi-
ciously complex, yet apparently legal, financial strategies. Working
in cahoots with other agencies, lenders such as Countrywide
Mortgage used regulators like Moody’s Investor Services, the oldest
and most prestigious US credit-ranking agency, to inflate their rat-
ings and attract investors, generating billions of dollars in revenue.
The house of cards fell in 2007 when banks’ investments in the sub-
prime market turned toxic and home owners defaulted on their bal-
looning mortgages. As anxieties escalated, the stock market plum-
meted and financial panic spread unabated, leading to corporate cut-
backs, downsizing, and record numbers of employee layoffs.
The four months preceding Cactus 1549’s Hudson River landing
were equally tumultuous on Wall Street, creating a ripple of shock-
waves throughout America. Venerable institutions such as Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the American International Group (AIG)
stumbled into bankruptcy, often after hefty government bail-outs.
Although each of these failures was significant in its own right,
when faced in rapid succession, the sudden collapse of such long-
established organisations caused the US economy to screech to a
halt, prompting comparisons to the ‘Great Depression’ as unemploy-
ment reached the highest rate in nearly three decades (Goodman and
Healy, 2009).
Meanwhile, another shocking example of overwhelming executive
greed and ineffectual industry oversight emerged in late 2008 when
Bernard L. Madoff confessed to orchestrating the world’s largest
Ponzi scheme. Cosy with industry regulators, Madoff’s $65 billion
international fraud continued for decades, only unravelling when
investors, rattled by the economic downturn, began withdrawing
funds faster than Madoff could replenish. In a sign of the liminality
of the hero image, after the hoax was revealed, one dumbfounded
66 AMY L. FRAHER
Madoff colleague noted, Bernie ‘was a hero to us. The head of Nasdaq.
We were proud of everything he had accomplished. Now, the hero has
vanished’ (Creswell and Thomas, 2009).
The proverbial last straw for many Americans – several million of
whom had lost their jobs, homes, and middle-class way of life – was
executive bonuses. Despite executive mismanagement, crippling
corporate losses, and multibillion-dollar government bail-outs,
many Wall Street employees and corporate executives still collected
an astonishing $18.4 billion in bonuses in 2008, one of the largest
paydays in history (Story, 2008). Perhaps most shocking was AIG,
which received $170 billion in taxpayer bail-out money yet still paid
$165 million in employee bonuses, in some cases to the very same
people who caused the financial crisis (Andrews and Baker, 2009).
Outraged, President Obama committed to pursuing ‘every single
legal avenue to block these bonuses’ (Andrews and Calmes, 2009)
while Congress rushed to pass a 90% retroactive tax to show angry
taxpayers that they intended to recoup their money (Hulse and
Herszenhorn, 2009).
Still another outrageous example was when America’s ‘Big Three’
car manufacturers, hit hard by the economic downturn, consumers’
inability to borrow money, and their own poor management deci-
sions, turned to the US government for aid. Even as executives trav-
elled the 525 miles from Detroit to Washington, hat-in-hand, to beg
for a government bail-out, they could hardly contain their gluttony:
each flew in a separate personal jet (Long, 2008). New York Con-
gressman Gary L. Ackerman enquired, ‘Couldn’t you all have down-
graded to first class or jet-pooled, or something, to get here? It would
have at least sent a message that you do get it’ (Schwartz, 2008).
As Fishwick (1969) observes, ‘Heroes are mirrors of the times’ 
(p. 2). Americans, fed up with corporate corruption, executive greed,
managerial whining, and regulatory shenanigans, were desperate
for an old-fashioned, stand-up guy; a mascot for the working man.
Perhaps that is part of Captain Sullenberger’s hero appeal, he does
appear to ‘get it’, a hardworking man with a high sense of personal
ethics and commitment to the greater good. A man aware of his role,
focused on his task, in touch with the risks, yet committed to the
outcome. Meticulously dressed, perfectly manicured, selflessly
humble, rock steady, and pragmatically articulate. He served his
country, did his job, and loves his family. He offered America an
image of how heroes could behave: selflessly with great compe-
tence, and a sense of the greater good in mind.
It seemed that the American media had finally found someone who
could measure up to the ‘good’ image of authority internalised in
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their youth. Making Sullenberger the hero-pilot allowed Americans
to collectively heal, reintegrating mythological definitions of hero-
ism as service, character, and commitment with more modern notions
of those possessing unique talents and good luck, exemplars of
American individualism. Like John Wayne’s veteran pilot character
in the 1954 film The High and the Mighty, Captain Sullenberger had
the emotional intelligence, cool headedness, and confident courage
under pressure to do the right thing, no matter the odds. Not since
well before 9/11 did US citizens feel so collectively proud of being an
American as they did following the Hudson River landing.
SPLITTING: THE ‘GREAT REGRESSION’
Psychodynamically speaking, groups often split-off uncomfortable
negative feelings and project them on to others, scapegoating in-
dividuals and groups while retaining positive feelings for them-
selves. In January 2009, the extraordinary lack of ethics in corporate
America made it easy for people to condemn self-serving bankers,
weak industry regulators, and greedy executives as ‘all bad’, a 
symbolic repository for negative images of the hero. Keeping the
problem external unconsciously relieved individual Americans of
responsibility for their role in creating the catastrophe, acting as a
defence against accepting risk and responsibility. Few wanted to
acknowledge the repercussions of America’s demand for low priced
goods, hunger for high investment returns, and obligation to expen-
sive homes and mortgages.
Emerging at just the right emotional moment, Captain Sullen-
berger provided the ‘all good’ image Americans desperately needed
to internalise. He became a barometer of public opinion, a reflection
of our fantasised selves – selfless hardworking Americans who act
for the greater good, not greedy Americans interested only in them-
selves and materialism – reflecting society’s innermost hopes and
beliefs in a public way. As a result, the emerging ‘Great Recession’
with its stock plunge, job losses, and foreclosures contributed to a
collective ‘Great Regression’ in which strong paternal symbols kept
the world safe.
An earlier example of this heroic image-making occurred in Nov-
ember 2008 when, amid great hope for the future, Americans elected
Barack Hussein Obama as the 44th President of the United States.
Quickly developing an unprecedented $787 billion stimulus plan to
jumpstart the economy, Obama promised to create new jobs, mod-
ernise the nation’s infrastructure, enhance energy independence,
expand educational opportunities, improve health care, provide tax
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relief, and protect those in greatest need. It seemed America had cre-
ated another hero.
Yet, what seems intriguing about these two examples of hero-
making is that although followers were ready to make each man a
Messiah, they were both reluctant heroes. Each was humble about
his achievements, recognising that his team’s accomplishments were
no miracle but rather the result of hard work and preparation. As
Captain Sullenberger calmly observed, ‘For 42 years, I had made
small, regular deposits of education, training and experience and the
experience balance was sufficient that on January 15th, I could make
a sudden, large withdrawal’ (Sullenberger, 2009a).
In another example, just five days after the Hudson River landing,
President Obama focused the nation on the work ahead in his
Inaugural Address by holding America responsible for ‘our collec-
tive failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new
age’ (Obama, 2009). Similarly, Captain Sullenberger spoke to a
Congressional hearing about ‘what is really at stake’ in air safety,
describing the impact of consumers’ desire for cheap airfares, bank-
ruptcies, mergers, and weak management as ‘an economic tsunami’
on airline safety. ‘I am worried,’ Captain Sullenberger confessed, if
things do not change ‘the airline piloting profession will not’ con-
tinue to ‘attract the best and the brightest.’ Future pilots will be ‘less
experienced and less skilled’ and this will have ‘negative conse-
quences’ for ‘safe air travel and our country’s economy and security’
(Sullenberger, 2009b).
Both President Obama and Captain Sullenberger used their author-
ity to refocus the country’s priorities, urging Americans to take
responsibility for what the USA had become as a way to unite the
fragmented ‘good’ and ‘bad’ images in a healthy way. Yet maintain-
ing this unity can be difficult. We do not like to face the anxieties that
these defences were created to shield us from. Although we love and
admire the hero because he saves us, there is a negative side to hero-
ism as well. We envy the hero for his courage and hate him for his
independence. We cannot control him and this frightens us because
it feels dangerous. And, because he does not need us the same way
we need him, we fear his power and influence, making it easy to
scapegoat (Hirschhorn and Young, 1993).
TEAMWORK: 
THE UNTOLD STORY OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
If the hero-pilot was not the singular saviour averting crisis on 15
January 2009, but rather was created through the collective needs of
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the American psyche, then what prevented this extraordinarily chal-
lenging situation from escalating into disaster and what anxieties
about responsibility and risk are masked by ignorance of these other
factors mitigating disaster?
For starters, excellent teamwork displayed by Patrick Harten and
his fellow air traffic controllers (ATC) prevented the already dire sit-
uation from deteriorating into tragedy. A ten-year ATC veteran,
Harten communicated with fourteen different people in fewer than
five minutes, diverting other aeroplanes while assisting the aircrew
with their final landing decision. Unlike previous accidents where
ATC distracted pilots from completing critical tasks, Mr Harten
allowed the aircrew to set the pace. When required, he asked specific
pertinent questions to make sure the entire team was on the same
page. And when asked a question, he replied with a short, specific
answer. Working collaboratively with the crew, he helped them
identify the resources available and set a tone of calm professional
support, all under incredible time constraints (Lowy, 2009).
Second, the actions of the experienced professionals on board 
the aircraft were also essential in averting disaster. Initially, First
Officer Skiles was flying the aircraft. A thirty-two-year aviation
industry veteran with over 20,000 flight hours and significant expe-
rience as a US Airways captain himself, Skiles transferred aircraft
control to the captain for landing and the crew immediately worked
together attempting engine restarts, activating the auxiliary power
unit, and running emergency checklists. Captain Sullenberger
reported,
My physiological reaction was strong. I had to force myself to use my
training and stay calm. I knew I needed to touch down with the wings
exactly level, nose slightly up and at a descent rate that was survivable,
just above our minimum flying speed but not below it. And I needed to
make all these things happen simultaneously. (Couric, 2009a)
Ninety seconds before hitting the water, Captain Sullenberger
made an announcement to the flight attendants and passengers:
‘Brace for impact!’ This was the flight attendants’ signal to prepare
passengers for an emergency landing. ‘I heard the flight attendants
begin shouting their commands to passengers’, the captain recalled,
saying
‘Heads down. Stay down.’ I could hear them clearly. They were chanting
it in unison over and over again. I felt very comforted by that. I knew
immediately that they were on the same page. That if I could land the air-
plane, that they could get them out safely. (ibid.).
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Similarly, Captain Sullenberger described the ‘amazingly good’
crew co-ordination on the flightdeck ‘considering how suddenly the
event occurred, how severe it was, and the little time they had’ to
prepare. In particular, he emphasised, although they ‘did not have
time to exchange words’ through ‘observation’ and ‘hearing’, he
‘knew’ that First Officer Stiles ‘knew what he had to do’, that they
‘were on the same page’ and this comforted him. First Officer Stiles
made similar comments. Each knew their ‘specific roles’, what the
other ‘was doing and they interacted when they needed to’. Captain
Sullenberger credited crew resource management (CRM) training, a
teamwork philosophy developed in aviation in the 1980s, for giving
them ‘the skills and tools that they needed to build a team quickly
and open lines of communication, share goals and work together’
(NTSB, 2009a).
As Captain Sullenberger alludes to, these psychologically stabil-
ising forces – for instance, observing his co-pilot was on the same
page and hearing that flight attendants were complying with estab-
lished procedures – built confidence in the team, assuring team-
mates that roles were clear and tasks were being accomplished. The
team was thinking through crisis (Fraher, 2011). This confidence
helped other teammates concentrate on their tasks, such as Captain
Sullenberger’s challenge of landing on water. If he had been dis-
tracted by teammates not completing their duties, things may have
ended differently.
Flight Attendants Donna Dent and Sheila Dail were sitting next
to each other in the front of the aircraft, Doreen Welsh was in the
rear. Everyone suspected the aeroplane had hit some birds, they
recalled. No one knew for sure. Ms Welsh noted there was some pas-
senger ‘panic in the back’ but ‘I calmed everyone down’ saying ‘We
might have lost one engine. We’ll circle around’ and return to the
airport. When she heard the call for ‘brace’, Ms Dail recalled, ‘I
thought, “Okay, we’re gonna crash on the runway” ‘. No one imag-
ined that they were landing on water. Even after touchdown, Ms
Dent said she was looking outside and ‘still thinking well maybe
there is water next to the runway that we just landed on.’ Ms Welsh
agrees, ‘When I got out of my seat and saw that water, it was the
most shocked I’ve ever been in my life’ (Couric, 2009b).
Yet, as a testament to their professionalism and training, they
quickly adjusted their mindset to the demands of the situation and
began evacuating. ‘I could see that the water was below me so I
opened my door and my emergency escape chute automatically
inflated’, Ms Dail recollected. Then the passengers ‘started coming’
and ‘there was no pushing and shoving’, it was quite orderly.
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Following the crew’s directions, passengers expeditiously egressed,
leaving belongings behind. Some assisted parents with babies and
older passengers until everyone had safely evacuated (Couric,
2009b).
Within minutes, local ferries, Coast Guard, and New York City
Fire and Police Department vehicles arrived on scene to help with
the rescue and recovery effort, mobilising their major emergency
response teams. About sixty-five ambulances, 140 fire-fighters and
police squad cars, helicopters, boats and rescue divers responded
(Heightman, 2009). One of the greatest strokes of luck in averting
this disaster was that it was still daylight, the surface of the river
was calm, and boat traffic was light just before the evening rush
when New York City commuters head back home to New Jersey.
Local ferry captains, most of whom had grown up working on the
river, were experienced at water rescue – albeit not typically from a
floating airliner – and quickly arrived on the scene from the nearby
piers.
The first ferry, Thomas Jefferson, arrived within five minutes of
the aeroplane hitting the water. Captain Vincent Lombardi radioed
the Coast Guard then helped deckhands, ticket agents, and bus dri-
vers hoist people from the water on board the vessels. Captain
Brittany Catanzaro of the Governor Thomas H. Kean, second on the
scene, recalled, ‘You train so much, you don’t have to think about it.
I didn’t have to give any orders to the crew.’ They simply knew what
to do. Deckhand Cosmo Mezzina agreed, focusing on the task was
the priority. ‘You don’t look right or left. You just look right in front
of you, just to save, to rescue those people’ (Dwyer, 2009).
Given the 36° water and 11° wind chill factor, temperatures that
wintry January day, the expeditious rescue of crash survivors was
paramount. Particularly critical was the fact that the human body
loses heat twenty-five times faster in cold water than air. Therefore,
people had less than thirty minutes before their body core tempera-
ture would drop and hypothermia would set in. Depending upon
the individual’s health, physical fitness, body mass index, clothing,
physical activity and posture in the water, it could take significantly
less time. However, many individuals who die from cold water
immersion do not die from hypothermia. They suffer a heart attack
either before becoming hypothermic or hours later, after rescue.
Therefore, the quality and timing of medical treatment was also
vitally important to survivability. As boats rescued victims, they
dropped them on both sides of the river, distributing survivors
around local hospitals rather than overwhelming one facility. This
ensured timely, quality care for the survivors.
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On 11 June 2009, the National Transportation Safety Board con-
cluded three days of public hearings in Washington DC investigat-
ing Flight 1549. Juxtaposed with the solemn news of the recent
disappearance of Air France Flight 447 over the Atlantic and crash of
Colgan Air Flight 3407 near Buffalo, this near-miss success story pro-
vided the peculiar comfort of a modern miracle. Yet, at the NTSB
hearings our hero-pilot Captain Sullenberger testified about an un-
sung hero. He celebrated the ‘importance of Crew Resource Man-
agement’ and of ‘a dedicated, well-experienced, highly trained crew
that can overcome substantial odds, work together as a team’. Team-
work was the hero averting disaster. Most reports explain disaster as
the result of a single flawed decision made by an operator (e.g., ‘pilot
error’). So it seems reasonable to assume Captain Sullenberger is the
‘hero’. Yet, this assumption is dangerous, as Captain Sullenberger
himself attests. Its danger is cutting ourselves off from resources that
help avert, or respond to, a crisis. These resources include an
increased willingness not to panic and hope for a saviour but rather
to step up, accept the risks, and take responsibility.
Let us now return to our previous hypothesis, that America’s
sophisticated hero-making process dynamically evolves the image
of heroism to reflect the needs of the observers as much as the deeds
of the hero, applying it to US Airways Flight 1549. What does the
social construction of Captain Sullenberger as ‘the pilot-hero’ tell us
about the psychological needs of Americans in January 2009? In
other words, let’s explore some of the possible purposes it served for
America to make Captain Sullenberger the hero-pilot.
DISCUSSION
Freud (1960) believed that individuals seek illusions to avoid reality
and protect themselves from the uncomfortable emotional truths of
group life. After enduring near-record job losses, foreclosures, Ponzi
schemes, government bail-outs, and a seemingly endless parade of
greedy executives, Americans seemed desperate for an old-fashioned,
stand-up guy to make them feel safe in 2009. The terror of facing feel-
ings of helplessness and powerlessness led many to focus emotions
on one person as a ‘hero-leader’ imagined to be all powerful, thereby
allowing the dysfunctional and destructive aspects of the system to
go unexamined.
As Bion (1961) noted, when a group is in this dependency basic
assumption, it operates as if members have joined together to be
sustained by a single leader on whom they completely depend. Once
people have deposited their psychological needs upon this hero-
leader, there is a regressive wish that they can now sit back and wait
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for him to solve their problems, acting as if they know nothing, have
no skills, and are helpless. By projecting their anxiety on to the hero,
followers free themselves ‘from the anxiety and responsibility of
taking action, seeking autonomy, taking risks, or expressing their
own fears and feelings’ (Gemmill and Oakley, 1997, p. 278).
Interestingly, Winnicott (1987) noted, when a group is most elated,
expressing manic emotions like the excitement that ensued in the
weeks following the Hudson River landing, it is most apt to develop
defences and less inclined to look at the serious aspects of life. In pro-
jecting their sense of incompleteness upon the hero-leader, in-
dividuals become caught in an illusion of helplessness that limits
their own contributions as well as debilitates the authority of the
leader. This mindlessness allows people to stop thinking and feeling
anxious in a form of ‘learned helplessness’ (Gemmill and Oakley,
1997, p. 278).
The dilemma in this hero-making process is that Americans abdi-
cated their own collective responsibility for creating a culture in
which these activities occurred, attempting to eliminate risk from
the equation. They conveniently failed, for instance, to comprehend
the implications of the desire for mortgaged homes, cheap airfares,
and high returns on investments on the industries which provide
these goods and services, wanting instead to reap the benefits with-
out sharing the risks. By making Captain Sullenberger America’s
hero, it validated this ‘good’ internalised image, convincing people
that even with bankruptcies, mergers, downsizing, and salary cuts,
the economy is still safe because ‘heroes’ are at the controls.
The danger in this ‘hero-making’ defence is that when this depen-
dency dynamic emerges, people suppress their awareness of others,
fantasising a special relationship to the hero while erroneously
believing they have no responsibly for themselves or others (Hirsch-
horn, 1997). The antidote to dependency is to accept responsibility,
creating reality based, positive internalised images of the risks and
responsibilities of adult life. Ironically, by accomplishing this, peo-
ple will increasingly rely on their own skills and authority just like
the pilots, flight attendants, air traffic controllers, passengers, and
emergency responders did on 15 January 2009, averting catastrophe.
This is the lesson we can learn from US Airways Flight 1549.
Note
1. Thanks to Kathleen B. Jones, Matthieu Daum, members of the
International Society for the Psychoanalytic Study of Organiza-
tions (ISPSO), and the O&SD anonymous reviewers for their
helpful feedback.
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